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REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Mother requests that this matter be scheduled for oral argument. 
ARGUMENT 
At the conclusion of the trial in this matter, the assigned district court judge issued the 
following statements from the bench: 
(1) "The Court finds that Defendant... [the mother] has not born her burden of proof 
in establishing that there has been a substantial change of circumstance." (Tr. 243); 
(2) "I don't find that there was sufficient evidence of abuse." (Tr. 243); 
(3) "I better not ever hear again in this court that either one of you [parents] have 
disciplined these children by physical means of a belt, a brush, or anything like that, nor 
threat. If I ever hear it again, Fm going to deal with you and you can spend some time in the 
County Jail and think about how that works out. I don't want that threat used." (Tr. 243); 
(4) "But I don't find that there's been substantiation of abuse on two occasions after 
the Decree of Divorce, which would justify the Court to make a finding that that is a 
significant or substantial change in circumstance." (Tr. 244); 
(5) "[T]here have been difficulties between parties and I attribute this to immaturity 
of the two parties, but I find that the Defendant [mother] has been openly willing -- or the 
Plaintiff [father] has been openly willing to grant to the Defendant [mother] visitation and 
that has been shown particularly during the last six months. Now, the Defendant [mother] 
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argues that that has occurred because of Court intervention. That may or may not be so." 
(Tr. 244); 
(6) "I do find that the event at the Nightime Pediatrics, of having Ms. Robertson take 
the children away — the injured child, particularly, away and then go to work, was insensitive 
to the child's needs I don't find any credibililty to the notion that he didn't give the 
ointments and treatment care. You were there at the facility and took the child from the 
facility. So that was not his fault. If anything, it was your fault for not taking it with you." 
(Tr. 245); 
(7) "As to how the parent is parenting, I don't find that there's a significant change 
of circumstances in regard to that." (Tr. 246); and, 
(8) "[T]he mother has not born the burden of proof required to have this case 
justify a modification." (Tr. 246). 
The father assumes that these statements are findings of fact. They are not. These 
statements are conclusions of law. Assuming, arguendo, that these statements are "facts" 
somehow mixed with a conclusion of law, there is not sufficient detail and enough subsidiary 
findings of fact to show the evidence upon which they are grounded. We know the ultimate 
conclusion, but we do not know the basis of the ultimate conclusion. 
If we take apart each statement, the ruling becomes unraveled: 
I. "FINDING NO. (1)" "The Court finds that Defendant.... [the mother] has not 
born her burden of proof in establishing that there has been a substantial change of 
circumstance." (Tr. 243). 
The trial court abuses its discretion if there is, "no reasonable basis for the decision." 
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Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). If the ruling, "is so 
unreasonable that it can be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of 
discretion," then the decision must be reversed. Kunzler v. O'DelL 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah 
App. 1993). In this case, the court rebuked the argument that the court had "approved" that 
part of the stipulation and decree of divorce that provided that child support was waived. 
(Tr. at 113 - 114). The court found that: (1) the children needed child support, (Tr. at 116), 
and that (2) the non-custodial parent had the obligation to pay (Tr. at 113). The court found 
that (3) the mother had not provided adequate support from the time of separation to the 
present time. (Tr. at 116). Based upon this analysis, the court concluded that there existed 
a substantial and material change of circumstances sufficient to justify the automatic 
implementation of a child support award. 
Given that analysis, does it make any sense whatsoever that the court found that 
mother failed to bear her burden of proving a substantial and material change of 
circumstances sufficient to justify the modification of the custody award? If (1) the court did 
not really "approve" the parties' stipulation; and (2) was not told about the father's admitted 
use of a belt to discipline the children before the entry of the decree; and (3) saw the mere 
threat of a belt in the week before trial on the petition to modify, as sufficient to warrant time 
in jail because of the harm to the children; then it also must follow that: (4) their existed a 
substantial and material change of circumstances sufficient to justify the automatic 
implementation of custody in the mother. How could the court reach a different conclusion? 
A. "FINDING NO. (2)" "I don't find that there was sufficient evidence of abuse." (Tr. 
5 
243). 
The trier of fact did not provide detailed facts supporting the conclusion that there 
was insufficient evidence of abuse. The overwhelming evidence does not support the 
Court's statement. 
The father argues in his brief that the mother "brain-washed" the children during the 
month of August, 1998, when he claims that the mother had absolute control over the 
children and he had no ability to intervene or have contact with the children. (See Father's 
Brief at 18 -19). However, the judge was silent as to whether this theory was ever adopted 
by the Court. Added to this silence is the problem that the evidence does not support father's 
theory. 
The testimony was conflicting during trial about the amount of contact that the father 
had with the children during the month of August, 1998. Dr. Davies testified that he had 
written to both attorneys on August 14, 1998, requesting that the children remain with their 
mother until after his appointment with her and the children scheduled for August 21st. (Tr. 
63 - 64). He stated in this letter that the children should be returned to their father after the 
scheduled appointment. (Id. at 64). 
On August 26th, Dr. Davies referred this case to Child Protective Services. (Id. At 
28). Although Dr. Davies personally favored notions of joint custody, (Tr. at 61), and was 
skeptical of allegations of child abuse raised during a pending custody evaluation, (Tr. at 28), 
so confident was he in his observations and analysis that he took the bold step of making one 
of the veiy few referrals to Child Protective Services that he had ever made during his long 
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career (Tr. at 28). 
Mr. McElroy, his bride, and the children met with Dr. Davies in the days following 
the report to Child Protective Services. (Tr. 59 & 120 - 121). Dr. Davies testified that the 
children consistently reported physical abuse against them by their father, regardless which 
parent accompanied the children to the custody evaluation. (Tr. 93). The children's 
complaint of physical violence was heard echoed on October 2, when the father brought the 
children in for an interview with the psychologist. (Tr. 93). Mr. McElroy reported to the 
doctor that his new bride had watched the children, "consistently for almost a month, and 
that was the end of August of 1998." (Tr. 42). The father presented information during trial 
that he had had telephone contact with the children during August, 1998. (Tr. at 200). 
The babysitter hired by the father testified that she did not see the children during the 
month of August. (Tr. 235). The first time she saw the children was shortly after the first 
of September when the father dropped the children off as usual. (Id.) 
Father admitted to Dr. Davies, and to the Court, that he had hit the children with a 
belt; but justified his continued exercise of physical custody by his excuse that he last struck 
the children long before the entry of the decree of divorce. (Tr. at 29 & 237). We all know 
the joke from law school about the attorney who asks the question of husband on cross-
examination, "Mr. Smith: when did you stop beating your wife?" This kind of question was 
funny in law school. It ceases being funny when it is played out for real in the tender life 
of young children. 
The Court concluded there was insufficient evidence of abuse. The father has opined 
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that that fact is evident from the custody evaluator's timing of his interview with the mother 
and children. Still, isn't it somewhat disconcerting that we really do not know why a second 
entity, Child Protective Services, expended its time and limited resources to train the father, 
"to deal with corporal punishment; i.e., hitting kids with a belt," in the absence of some 
evidence of abuse? (Tr. 67; 238 - 239). 
And what about the fact that the court itself saw the case from very different 
perspectives? The assigned district court commissioner ordered an investigation into the 
allegations of child abuse and neglect. (Tr. 125 & 153). The commissioner appointed a 
guardian ad litem. (R. 470). The commissioner had to explain to the father - during the 
pendency of the lawsuit — that he could not deny visitation to the mother simply because 
the mother did not allow him to go into and throughout her home to look around? (R. 236). 
The trial judge vacated the commissioner's recommendation. (R. 474). While there can be 
no doubt that the trial judge had the authority and the duty to oversee the case, there were 
already in place two prior orders from the assigned judge and the presiding judge which 
denied the father's motion to appear before the assigned district judge, rather than the 
commissioner. (R. 390 & 415). 
B. "FINDING NO. (3)" "I better not ever hear again in this court that either one of 
you [parents] have disciplined these children by physical means of a belt, a brush, or 
anything like that, nor threat If I ever hear it again, I'm going to deal with you and you 
can spend some time in the County Jail and think about how that works out. I don't 
want that threat used." (Tr. 243). 
The father admitted to threatening the children after entry of the decree with the 
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possibility of a whipping with a belt. (Tr. 237). The judge admonished the father that if 
that threat was repeated, he would go to jail. (Tr. 243). If the mere threat was sufficient to 
warrant jail time in the future, why was it not sufficient to justify jail time at the time of trial? 
If we shudder for the children at what must have run through their minds then, how 
can we justify the possibility of a repeat performance? 
The other gnawing question springing from this conclusion is, that if the basis for the 
custody decision was that the mother was "insensitive" to the children by going to work 
following Zane's burn injury, was the father more — or less — "insensitive to the needs of 
the children" when he threatened to hit them with a belt, knowing that the children probably 
would not be able to see his threat as a "nifty bluff?" (Tr. 238). But, again, we do not even 
know for sure if mother's "insensitivity" was the deciding factor for the custody award. 
Last, but not least, can comfort really be found in father's assurance to the Court at 
trial that he had mastered the subject of corporal punishment? (Tr. at 67; 238 - 239). After 
all, it was also the father who testified that he last threatened to hit one of his children with 
a belt during the week before trial. (Tr. at 237). 
C. "FINDING NO. (4)" "But I don't find that there's been substantiation of abuse on 
two occasions after the Decree of Divorce, which would justify the Court to make a 
finding that that is a significant or substantial change in circumstance." (Tr. 244). 
The decree of divorce in this matter was entered on July 23, 1996. (R. 47). Mother 
answered cross-examination questions by admitting that she never saw the father abuse the 
children, or "overdiscipline the kids" during the marriage. (Tr. at 186). She also admitted 
that the first time that she ever reported physical abuse of the children was on February 18, 
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1997. (Tr. at 187). The first substantiation of abuse occurred on August 26, 1998. (Tr. at 
27). 
Mother also played a telephone message left by one of the children telling her that he 
had run away and that the father had whipped him with a belt. (Tr. at 215 - 216). There was 
no dispute that one of the children had run away from his father during the pendency of the 
action. (Tr. at 197). 
IL Whatever happened to the rest of Mother's allegations and testimony? 
A. Father's interference with mother's relationship with the children. The trial court 
stated that "it may or may not be so" that the father was openly willing to finally grant 
visitation during the last six months before trial only because of the court's intervention. (Tr. 
at 244). Interference with visitation by a custodial parent with the visitation rights of the 
non-custodial parent is relevant to both the issues of a change of circumstances and the 
children's best interests. Smith v. Smith. 793 P.2d 407 (Utah App. 1990). 
The mother alleged, and later testified and argued, that the father had interfered with 
her relationship to such a degree following the entry of the decree of divorce, to justify the 
court's transfer of the care, custody and control of the children to her. (Tr. at 8 - 9 & 142 -
147). The father was asked by his attorney: "[I]f they [the children] remain living with you, 
the question was earlier this morning, are you the kind of guy that will allow Kerry 
appropriate visitation rights and to maintain her relationship with the children?" (Tr. at 241) 
The father responded: "Yes, of course." (Id.). 
Dr. Davies testified as part of the father's ongoing campaign to extract the mother 
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from the children's lives, a move to Mississippi with the children was planned by the father. 
(Tr. at 21). The Court stated that it should "deal with that issue before we conclude here," 
(Tr. at 253), and take "affirmative steps to see that both parents conveniently remain in the 
lives of these children" because each parent contributed attributes important to the well being 
of the children. (Tr. At 255 - 256). To that allegation, the father admitted that a move was 
contemplated. (Tr. at 256). The court issued an order requiring advance notice of a 
contemplated move. (Tr. at 257). Nevertheless, when the order was prepared by the father 
without such a requirement, the court overruled the mother's objection. (Tr. at R. 504). 
B.. Changes in the father's personal behavior with regard to his medical treatment 
his work schedule and willingness to allow mother to provide surrogate care after the decree. 
The initial findings of fact and decree of divorce were based upon stipulation and did 
not include an objective assessment of the relationships between parent and child. The 
witnesses who testified as to the nature of the relationships prior to the entry of the decree 
stated: 
1. Father was unemployed at the time of entry of the decree. (Tr. 240). Dr. 
Davies reported that the family had had to uproot and move from one town to another on 
more than one occasion because the father could not hold down a job; the father was not 
performing or sustaining care for his family; and because of his involvement in crime. (Tr. 
at 51). 
2. After the parties separated, the father desired to reconcile with mother, and the 
parties attempted a reconciliation. (Tr. 157). He allowed mother to come and go at will 
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when spending time with the children and while she continued to nurse their youngest child. 
(Tr. at 142 - 143). They freely shared information about the children and time with the 
children. (Tr. 144 - 146). 
3. Father hit the children with a belt and claimed he stopped two and one-half 
years ago. (Tr. 237). Mother saw her relationship between parent and child as being a 
"buffer" between the children and their father whenever her husband went out of control in 
his discipline of the children. (Tr. at 214). 
4. Dr. Davies indicated that the father and stepmother both had elevated scales 
in their MMPI2 scales indicating rigid personalities. (Tr. at 37 ). Mother was emotionally 
and mentally stable and healthy. (Tr. at 38 ). 
The trial court concluded: 
"As to how the parent is parenting, I don't find that there's 
a significant change of circumstances in regard to that." (Tr. 
246). 
The statement of the trial court was issued after hearing the following evidence: 
1. Father's currently works a graveyard shift. (Tr. at 24). The children reported 
that the father slept when the children returned home from school. (Tr. at 48 ). Dr. Davies 
opined that the oldest child had been forced to take over the responsibilities of caring for 
himself and the two younger children. (Tr. at 46). Dr. Davies observed the father using 
caller identification and his cell phone to restrict access to the children by the mother. (Tr. 
at 123). 
2. Zane was seriously burned and his father took him to the hospital in March, 
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1997. (Tr. at 89 & 164 & 178). The parties' youngest son suffered a broken arm. (Tr. 164). 
The mother was concerned because neither child was being adequately supervised at the time 
of the accidents. (Tr. 164). On June 25, 1998, Ian ran away from his father's home. (Tr. 
197). Ian left a message on his mother's answering machine proclaiming that his father had 
whipped him with a belt. (Tr. 216 ). The police intervened when it was reported that Ian 
had run away from his father's home. (Tr. 214). 
3. Father had placed the children away from the mother's care to be watched by 
a babysitter after March, 1998. (Tr. at 228). Ms. Algaier felt that she could recognize the 
signs of child abuse. (Tr. at 229). Shortly before trial, however, father reassigned the 
responsibility of care of the children from Theresa Allgaier (who might have been able to tell 
the court if their continued to be threats or beatings of the children). 
4. The children are now in the care of their stepmother — a woman the children 
had had no relationship with; who was unable to speak the same language as the children; 
and, who has now added to the family unit a stepmother having the same rigid personality 
as the father. (Tr. at 38). 
5. At the time of trial, the father disciplined with only the threat that he will hit 
the children with a belt. It is a "nifty bluff' because the children do not realize that he is just 
kidding. The children quickly conform to their father's expectations, because of fear that he 
will carry out his threat. (Tr. at 238). The children kissed and hugged their father during 
four months of 1998, (Tr. at 229), which period of time was in between the time that the 
father admitted he changed from physical abuse of the children to mental abuse of the 
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children. 
6. Father remarried during the pendency of the action. (Tr. at 41). Father had 
to pull out a note to tell the evaluator the name of his fiance and we really are not too sure 
about how and when the two met. (Tr. 59). Nevertheless, the woman has no relationship 
with the children, in part because she cannot speak the children's language. (Tr. 41 - 42). 
The court stated at the conclusion of the trial that the father should work on his pro-
blem of having a rigid personality, "I think you need to listen to the comments, Mr. McElroy, 
about being rigid and about being rigid in your views. This is something that you may have 
to work on for a long time, but I don't find that the circumstances changed and you became 
more rigid after the divorce decree and thus I can't rely on it to be a substantial or material 
change of circumstances, but it is something that you better be aware of because it does play 
out in a difficult way." (Tr. at 246). 
8. The father intends to explore the possibility of computer training. (Tr. at 256). 
This may mean moving to another state. (Tr. at 256). He is also thinking about pulling up 
stakes and moving across country with his children to the State of Mississippi. (Tr. at 255 -
256). 
9. The parties separated in 1995 and Mrs. McElroy established what she intended 
to be as a temporary separate residence from her husband and children. (Tr. 185 & 220). 
Mother saw her husband and the children freely and continued nursing the youngest child. 
(Tr. 185 & 220). Mother provided surrogate care while father worked. (Tr. 193), The 
parties attempted reconciliation and the mother sought religious guidance about her marriage. 
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(Tr. 185 & 220). The stipulated decree of divorce was entered on July 23, 1996. (R. 47). 
10. During the Fall of 1996, the mother attempted to enter into the military ser-
vice. (Tr. at 56). The father, also during September, 1996, (Tr. at 56 & 97), sought 
assistance from the Office of Recovery Services. Initially, the mother was assigned to the 
army reserves and trained at Fort Douglas once a month. (Tr. at 153 - 154). Her plan was 
to remain in Utah. (Tr. 154). On November 25, 1996, the mother attempted to enlist in the 
U.S. Army for six years with her children. (Tr. 179). In December, 1996, the mother told 
father that she intended to reopen the custody issue because of changes in the children's 
behavior and the father's changes to their custody arrangement. (Tr. 155). She talked with 
army officials about concerns that she was having with the children and the army used the 
fact that she had three children to let her out of service. (Tr. 181). She talked with an 
attorney on January 17, 1997. (Tr. 156). In January, 1997, mother was denied enlistment 
into the military. (Tr. 33). The mother viewed the military as a vehicle to become more 
stable, get an education and move on. (Tr. 49). 
11. Father asked mother to terminate her parental rights. (Tr. 217). 
12. Father stopped taking his medicine; stopped going to court-ordered counseling; 
and, stopped giving Ian the child's medicine, during the summer of 1996. (Tr. 156 - 158; 
HI. It does not matter if the evidence gets marshaled, if you can only guess the basis of 
the ruling. 
If the findings of fact and conclusions of law are inadequate, as mother claims them 
to be, then she can only guess what the trial judge actually determined the facts to be, and 
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how the facts were weighed against one another in reaching the conclusion. See Jeffs v. 
Stuhbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Utah 1998); Woodward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah 
App. 1991). Clearly, the court took note of some portions of Dr. Davies' testimony but did 
not adopt the entire recommendation. (See e.g. Judge Young's statements to the father about 
addressing his personality challenges.) 
The confusion is illustrated in the first example given by the father in his brief. The 
father points out that mother did not discuss in her initial brief the judge's admonishment to 
her that she was "insensitive" to Zane's needs. (Tr. 16 -17). Quite frankly, mother and her 
counsel do not see this admonishment to have anything to do with the basis for the custody 
decision. Changes in the parenting of the non-custodial parent do not form, as a general rule, 
a basis for a modification of a child custody award. See Kramer v. Kramer, 738 P.2d 624, 
629 (Utah 1987). It is absurd to even think that the court weighed this testimony more 
heavily than the father's "nifty bluff of frightening the children into submission with the 
thought of being hit with a belt. 
Further, what about the mother's claim, and Dr. Davies' testimony, that the father was 
sleeping during his waking hours with the children and not providing adequate supervision? 
Again, the injury did not occur while the child was in the mother's home. Could it possibly 
make sense that the lack of adequate supervision was less serious than the mother's 
momentary lapse in "sensitivity?" After all, the judge must have ultimately found that the 
mother was a caring parent, or else his ruling about the children's continued need for then-
mother's "reason, and sympathy and understanding " makes no sense at all. (Tr. at 255). 
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The judge must have also concluded, though we may never know for sure, that the 
mother's failure to take the medicine from the hospital (assuming that the medicine was 
given to the patient by the hospital), was more "insensitive to the child's needs" than the 
father's unilateral rescheduling of the child's second and third burn treatments to a date and 
time not known by the mother. (Tr. at 165). 
Or maybe the court rejected Dr. Davies' testimony that the father was emotionally 
unstable; financially unstable; not empathetic with the children's needs; not objective about 
his former wife or forthright, interfered with visitation and was unfair in his method of 
discipline. (Tr. at 40, 47,49, 52, 61). The court must have also dismissed the father's 
announcement of a plan to uproot the children so that he could find a new career field in the 
State of Mississippi. (Tr. 256). Otherwise, the court's statement that the children needed 
their father's ongoing "structure, stability and security" makes no sense. (Tr. at 255). 
However, assuming that the appellate court's panel agrees with the father that this 
evidence forms the basis for the ruling, then this court should also consider that the minor 
child Zane was already in the examination room being treated when the mother arrived. (Tr. 
at 89). There was no testimony about which parent had access to the medical supplies or 
which parent received the prescription or treatment plan for the child's care. The court and 
the father both assumed that the medical facility gave the supplies to the parents and that the 
parent taking the child home was the parent having access to the supplies and/or prescription. 
Remember, the particular event was only presspted by the father as a hypothetical. (Tr. at 
89). The result may have been different if the parent allowed in the examination room with 
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the nurse and Zane held only a medical prescription or treatment plan. To catch the subtle 
distinction between the testimony and the assumption, reread the last paragraph of father's 
brief at page 16. Notice that the mother testified that she "bought the stuff because Shawn 
never brought it." 
Father focused much attention at trial and in his brief, about mother's plans to enter 
the military. This fact does not really have anything to do with the issue of modification of 
the custody award, because it involves the non-custodial parent's circumstances after entry 
of the decree. Even if the fact were important, the father misunderstands the evidence and 
appears not to understand the testimony and sequence of events. After entry of the decree 
there was a time when mother was enlisted in the reserves and trained locally. This time 
period was followed by an entirely separate attempt to enlist into active duty with the army. 
All of these events were associated with the mother's attempts to become self-sufficient and 
able to provide for herself and the children. 
First, mother was employed after the parties' 1995 separation and went through a 
period of time when she and her husband explored reconciliation. (Tr. 185). The parties 
could not resolve their differences and a decree of divorce was entered on July, 1996. (Tr. 
141). 
After entry of the decree of divorce, the mother trained with the army reserves one 
day per month at Fort Douglas. She continued to reside here in Salt Lake City with the 
children. (Tr.l54& 185). 
Mother also explored enlisting for a six year term with the army, but contemplated 
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taking the children with her. (Tr. 179). She applied for enlistment on November 25, 1996. 
(Tr. 179) After it became obvious that the children were not adjusting to the divorce; that 
the father had stopped allowing their time-sharing arrangement; that the father told the 
children that he was moving them back to Mississippi; and, after discussing the problems 
with her children with military officers, the mother took steps with the cooperation of her 
officers, to get out of any enlistment. (Tr. 181). She also met with a private local attorney 
who ultimately took the case to trial on January 17, 1997. (Tr.212 ) She was given notice 
of her denied entry into the military on January, 1997. (Tr. 180 ). 
Dr. Davies testified that the information about the military did not leave him to 
beheve that the mother abandoned her children. (Tr. 55). Rather, mother was using military 
service as a means to get to an end to better her education, employment and earning power. 
(Tr. 55). A reasonable person would conclude the same. Whatever significance that the 
father attaches to the enlistment, the trial court did not even mention the issue in rendering 
its decision from the bench. 
The significance of the babysitter's testimony is another mystery in this case. The 
trial judge did not express the conclusion that the mother had "brainwashed" the children and 
therefore the substantiated abuse claim was not reliable evidence. The trial judge's statement 
was that there was "insufficient evidence" of abuse after the entry of the decree of divorce. 
The court then advised the parents that either parent would be incarcerated if the judge heard 
again that the children were threatened or disciplined by a belt. (Tr. at 243 - 244). That 
statement smacks of credibility to some portion of the mother's claim for abuse. What is not 
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clear, however, is how much more evidence does the court need to substantiate abuse if the 
admissions from the perpetrator do not meet the test? With all due respect to the Court, does 
it take the mother producing the admissions plus the bruises and hand prints from the 
children's buttocks and thighs - or perhaps the burn marks or discarded cast from the broken 
arm - to prove her claim? 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the findings of fact are not articulated in sufficient detail so that the basis 
of the ultimate conclusions expressed from the bench can be understood and the trial judge's 
reasoning process reviewed. Therefore, the general requirement of marshaling the evidence 
does not apply to this case. See Williamson v. Williamson. 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 46 (Utah 
App. 1999). 
Further, reasonable persons examining this case can only be left with a definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made in light of the evidence that was presented. 
Is an admonishment by the third branch of our state the best that we can do to protect the 
children of this state and this couple? The three little boys in this case deserve more than an 
admonishment to their caretaker to stop hitting and threatening them and to try to straighten 
out somehow the personality traits that make this father the man that he is. 
DATED on this 17th day of February, 2000. 
lettc 
M. Joy l{ 
Attorney for 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, to Mr. 
Gary Buhler, P.O. Box 229, Grantsville, Utah 84029-0229, on this 17th day of February, 
2000. 
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